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Politicizing the End of Life:
Lessons from the Schiavo Controversy
BARBARA A. NOAH*
ABSTRACT
The case of Theresa Marie Schiavo raises challenging legal and
ethical issues, although the events of the case are not entirely novel.
It is a well-settled principle under Florida law that individuals have a
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. After years of liti-
gation, numerous courts have confirmed that removal of life support
is legally appropriate under the facts of this case. Nevertheless, six
days after Theresa's feeding tube was removed, the Florida legisla-
ture opted to intervene in the final judicial decision by granting the
Governor the authority to overrule the court's decision and to order
the tube reinserted. These actions violate numerous Florida constitu-
tional provisions, including the requirement of separation of powers,
the provision guaranteeing individuals a right of privacy, and the due
process clause. Apart from the legal issues, the ethical implications
of such interventions present a frightening prospect for the future of
patient autonomy. This is not the first time that a government has
interfered in a dispute over end-of-life care, and it will not be the
last. In view of this reality, it is essential that individual choice
remain the touchstone in end-of-life decision-making, and that courts,
legislatures, and individuals do everything possible to prevent this
very precious choice from being held hostage to the vicissitudes of
political or moral change.
In politics, an absurdity is not a handicap.
-Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821)
I. INTRODUCTION
Fourteen years ago, at the age of twenty-six, Theresa Marie Schi-
avo lapsed into a permanent vegetative state (PVS) after a cardiac arrest
* Research Associate & Lecturer, Health Law & Policy, University of Florida, College of
Law; Adjunct Professor, University of Florida College of Medicine; Member, Shands Hospital
Ethics Advisory Committee; J.D., Harvard Law School. I presented portions of this essay at the
annual health law teachers' conference (co-sponsored by Seton Hall School of Law and the
American Society for Law, Medicine & Ethics), and at the Florida Bioethics Network's annual
conference. I would like to thank Kathy Cerminara, Jon Mills, and Lars Noah for their helpful
suggestions.
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deprived her brain of oxygen for an extended period. Since then, a tube
providing artificial nutrition and hydration has kept her body alive.'
Because non-comatose PVS patients, such as Theresa, experience wak-
ing and sleeping cycles, open their eyes, move their limbs, and utter
sounds,2 some people, including Theresa's parents Robert and Mary
Schindler, find it difficult to accept that she lacks any capacity for
thought, emotion, or other activities associated with consciousness.
With the passage of years, Theresa's cerebral cortex has withered and
liquefied, but her brainstem remains intact. Thus, she breathes without
assistance, but she cannot experience or interact with her environment
and requires comprehensive care, including artificial nutrition and
hydration through a tube, to sustain her body.3 Several medical experts
have concluded that Theresa will never recover any measurable brain
function.4 Notwithstanding these expert opinions, her parents retain the
hope that Theresa will benefit from unconventional efforts at
rehabilitation.5
For roughly the past seven years, Theresa's husband, Michael Schi-
avo, has been seeking permission from the Florida courts to have her
feeding tube removed so that she can die peacefully. Michael has based
his request on Theresa's previously expressed wishes and values,
1. See Abby Goodnough, Governor of Florida Orders Woman Fed in Right-to-Die Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2003, at Al.
2. See Multi-Soc'y Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State
(pt. 1), 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1500 (1994) [hereinafter PVS Report (pt. 1)] ("Patients in a
vegetative state are usually not immobile. They may move the trunk or limbs in meaningless
ways. They may occasionally smile, and a few may even shed tears .. . utter grunts or, on rare
occasions, moan or scream. . . . These motor activities may misleadingly suggest purposeful
movements .... "); see also id. at 1501; cf. Christopher M. Booth et al., Is this Patient Dead,
Vegetative, or Severely Neurologically Impaired?, 291 JAMA 870 (2004) (evaluating data on
neurological outcomes after cardiac arrest, and concluding that several clinical signs that become
apparent just twenty-four hours after cardiac arrest serve as reliable predictors of poor
neurological prognosis).
3. See PVS Report (pt. 1), supra note 2, at 1501 ("The adjective 'persistent' refers only to a
condition of past and continuing disability with an uncertain future, whereas 'permanent' implies
irreversibility. Persistent vegetative state is a diagnosis; permanent vegetative state is a
prognosis.").
4. See Multi-Soc'y Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State
(pt. 2), 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1572, 1572-73 (1994) [hereinafter PVS Report (pt. 2)] (explaining
that the "prognosis for cognitive and functional recovery depends on the cause of the underlying
brain disease" and that recovery of consciousness after three months is rare in adults with
nontraumatic injuries to the brain). One year after nontraumatic brain injury, only fifteen percent
of adults in the study had recovered any degree of consciousness and, for those few who regained
consciousness, recovery of function was "extremely poor." See id. at 1573, 1575 tbl.5. Because
Theresa's brain injury resulted from a nontraumatic cause (a cardiac arrest) she has essentially no
chance of any measurable recovery after fourteen years.
5. See William R. Levesque, Doctors Offer Voices for Terri Schiavo, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Oct. 25, 2003, at I B (quoting various family members who believe that Theresa responds
to them with smiles and eye movements).
[Vol. 59:107
POLITICIZING THE END OF LIFE.
explaining that Theresa would have never wanted to continue to exist in
a vegetative state after all hope of recovery had vanished. At the same
time, her parents have continuously and vigorously objected to this
request, arguing that the evidence of Theresa's wishes is insufficient and
that its source is suspect. In a series of judicial decisions, state and fed-
eral courts have repeatedly confirmed the legal propriety of acceding to
Michael's request, finding evidence of Theresa's wishes legally suffi-
cient to support the removal of life supportive measures.6 Last fall, after
they had exhausted the available legal avenues, the Schindlers appealed
to the Governor of Florida (Jeb Bush) for help, and, six days after The-
resa's feeding tube was removed, the Florida legislature enacted a spe-
cial bill authorizing the Governor to intervene in the dispute.7
This is certainly not the first end-of-life dispute to pit family mem-
bers against one another or to generate difficult ethical and legal dilem-
mas for treating physicians. In some of its ethical, medical, and political
dimensions, the Theresa Schiavo case presents an eerie reprise of the
now famous Baby K case.8 In October of 1992, Contrenia Harrell gave
birth to a baby girl named Stephanie. The child, later designated as
"Baby K" in court documents, was born with anencephaly, a congenital
condition in which most of the brain, including the cerebrum, fails to
develop, leaving affected infants with an absent higher brain but with an
intact brainstem. In its medical manifestations, anencephaly resembles
PVS. Both conditions leave affected individuals entirely devoid of cog-
nitive abilities or awareness but with spontaneous cardiac and respira-
tory functions.' Although physicians diagnosed Stephanie's condition
prenatally, Ms. Harrell chose not to terminate the pregnancy. 10
Beyond the medical comparisons, these cases share other signifi-
cant elements in common. Certain family members in each case refused
to accept the grim prognosis, resulting in a dispute over appropriate
treatment that ultimately required judicial resolution. In the Baby K
case, physicians treating Stephanie explained to her mother that mechan-
6. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). For a
detailed timeline of events in the litigation, see Steve Haidar & Kathy Cerminara, Key Events in
the Case of Theresa Marie Schiavo, at http://www.miami.edu/ethics2/schiavo/timeline.htm (last
modified Jan. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Key Events].
7. See Adam Liptak, In Florida Right-to-Die Case, Legislation that Puts the Constitution at
Issue, N.Y. TIMes, Oct. 23, 2003, at A20.
8. See In re Baby "K," 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 825 (1994).
9. See PVS Report (pt. 1), supra note 2, at 1501-03 (describing related conditions leading to
permanent unconsciousness, including coma, whole brain death, various degenerative brain
disorders, and developmental malformations such as anencephaly).
10. See George J. Annas, Asking the Courts to Set the Standard of Emergency Care- The
Case of Baby K, 330 NEw ENO. J. MED. 1542, 1542 (1994) (explaining that the "mother's position
was that 'all human life has value,' including her anencephalic daughter's life").
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ical ventilation and other supportive measures were medically inappro-
priate because they served no therapeutic or palliative purpose and
instead only prolonged the dying process. While Stephanie's father
agreed to discontinue treatment, Ms. Harrell steadfastly refused to con-
sent to the withdrawal of support."'
Furthermore, in these and other cases, religious organizations inter-
vened in support of those family members seeking to continue treatment,
despite the objections of physicians and others that such treatment was
medically inappropriate. Finally, various state governmental entities
have intervened in several of these treatment disputes, each time advo-
cating in favor of continued treatment. In Baby K, the state Department
for Rights of Virginians with Disabilities simply submitted an amicus
brief in support of continued treatment.' 2 In the Schiavo case, the state's
intervention, described in detail below, represents an even more dis-
turbing interference with fundamental principles of personal autonomy
in the medical decision-making context. The dispute is more than an
isolated and extraordinary case: it offers a cautionary tale about the seri-
ous hazards associated with political meddling in individual bioethical
controversies.
II. EXERCISING THERESA'S RIGHT TO REFUSE
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
It is a well-settled principle under Florida law that individuals have
a right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. In fact, the combina-
tion of Florida's constitution, 13 statutes, and case law appears more
clearly protective of a right to refuse such treatment than the federal due
process standard discussed in Cruzan.t4 The right of refusal is grounded
in the ethical principle of autonomy that allows patients to retain control
over their bodies. This right of bodily integrity does not disappear when
11. See id. at 1542. For another example of a case in which parents disagreed about medical
decision-making for a terminally ill child resulting in a judicial order forbidding the termination of
life support, see In re Jane Doe, 418 S.E.2d 3 (Ga. 1992).
12. See In re Baby "K," 16 F.3d at 592 (listing amici in the case).
13. The Florida Constitution, unlike the U.S. Constitution, contains an explicit provision
guaranteeing citizens a right of privacy. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("Every natural person has
the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life except
as otherwise provided herein.").
14. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Justice Rehnquist's
opinion in Cruzan, while noting that the "principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions," id. at 278, merely concludes that the U.S. Constitution does not forbid states like
Missouri from requiring a "clear and convincing" standard of evidence to prove that an
incapacitated person would wish to forego life-sustaining measures in proceedings in which a
guardian seeks judicial permission to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from a person in
PVS. See id. at 280-85.
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patients become unable to express their wishes. Instead, the law in Flor-
ida, as most elsewhere, permits a proxy decision-maker to step in to
articulate the desires of incapacitated patients. In a landmark decision
announced the same year that Theresa suffered her attack, the Florida
Supreme Court in In re Guardianship of Browning ordered the removal
of a feeding tube from a patient in PVS based on her preferences as
expressed in a living will. The decision confirmed that an incompetent
person's guardian, surrogate, or proxy decision-maker may exercise this
privacy-based right of refusal on the patient's behalf, whether those
wishes have been expressed orally or in writing.1 5
Florida law explicitly recognizes the validity of oral advance direc-
tives. 16 A state statute enacted in the wake of the Browning decision
provides that if the patient has not designated a surrogate decision-maker
in writing, then a proxy decision-maker can represent her wishes. In
Florida, as in many states, the statutory hierarchy of proxies grants deci-
sional authority to the incapacitated patient's spouse ahead of her par-
ents.17 Because Theresa Schiavo did not designate a surrogate decision-
maker in writing, her husband Michael presumptively serves as the
proxy decision-maker in accordance with Florida law.' 8 The statute fur-
ther requires that, before a proxy may exercise an incapacitated
patient's right to withdraw life-prolonging measures, the decision "must
be supported by clear and convincing evidence that the decision would
have been the one the patient would have chosen had the patient been
competent."' 9 After years of litigation, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court's conclusion that the evidence presented through the testi-
15. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (reviewing the case of a
woman in a persistent vegetative state and dependent on a feeding tube). It is all the more
remarkable that, at the time, Florida's statute specifically excluded artificial nutrition and
hydration from its definition of life-prolonging procedures. See id. at 9 & n.5. Thus, the Florida
Supreme Court's decision to respect the patient's refusal as set out in her living will, despite the
lack of explicit statutory authority on this point, constitutes a powerful endorsement of the
individual right of autonomy at the end of life.
16. See FLA. STAT. ch. 765.101 (2004) (defining "advance directive" as "a witnessed written
document or oral statement in which instructions are given by a principal ...concerning any
aspect of the principal's health care"); FLA. STAT. ch. 765.104(c) (2004) (permitting the oral
amendment or revocation of an advance directive).
17. The Florida statutes created the following statutory hierarchy: (1) court-appointed guard-
ian (if already appointed); (2) spouse; (3) majority of adult children; (4) parents; (5) majority of
adult siblings; (6) other relative; (7) friend; and (8) clinical social worker appointed by bio-ethics
committee. See FLA. STAT. ch. 765.401 (2004).
18. The court also appointed Michael Schiavo as Theresa's formal guardian in 1990.
Although Theresa's parents have challenged the propriety of this designation and have sought the
removal of Michael, they have not succeeded. At various points during the litigation, the court
also appointed different individuals to serve as guardian ad litems for Theresa. See Key Events,
supra note 6.
19. See FLA. STAT. ch. 765.401(3) (2004).
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:107
mony of Michael Schiavo and several of Theresa's friends satisfied this
statutory standard of proof.2"
The Florida statutes also explicitly affirm that the right of refusal
covers all life-prolonging procedures and treatments, including artificial
nutrition and hydration. 2' The specific inclusion of these measures in
the enumerated list of life-prolonging procedures coincides with the eth-
ical position that there is no scientific or moral basis on which to distin-
guish such interventions from other types of life support such as
mechanical ventilation.22 Moreover, medical experts repeatedly have
confirmed that the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from a
20. The appellate court confirmed the trial court's conclusion that the standard of evidence
had been met, and observed that, "in the end, this case is not about the aspirations that loving
parents have for their children. It is about Theresa Schiavo's right to make her own decision,
independent of her parents and independent of her husband." See In re Guardianship of Schiavo,
851 So. 2d 182, 186-87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Florida's statute requires "clear and
convincing" evidence that the substituted judgment decision is the one the patient would have
chosen if competent. By contrast, more conservative jurisdictions such as Michigan and New
York require clear and convincing evidence that the particular patient actually wanted specific
measures taken or refused. See, e.g., In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363 (N.Y. 1981); In re Westchester
County Med. Ctr. (O'Connor), 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988).
21. See FLA. STAT. ch. 765.101(10) (2004) (defining "life-prolonging procedure" as "any
medical procedure, treatment, or intervention, including artificially provided sustenance and
hydration, which sustains, restores, or supplants a spontaneous vital function"). Other states have
taken different approaches to the issues surrounding artificial nutrition and hydration. Some
statutes require specific statements about individual patient preferences regarding artificial
nutrition and hydration rather than considering these measures as part of the general category of
life-sustaining treatments. See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.09 (West 2004). Other states
take the opposite position, requiring the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from
terminally ill patients absent an advance directive expressing a contrary preference. See, e.g.,
NEV. REV. STAT. 449.624 (2004).
22. Numerous courts and commentators have affirmed this position.
[W]e see no reason to differentiate between the multitude of artificial devices that
may be available to prolong the moment of death .... We are unable to distinguish
on a legal, scientific, or a moral basis between those artificial measures that sustain
life- whether by means of "forced" sustenance or "forced" continuance of vital
functions- of the vegetative, comatose patient who would soon expire without the
use of those artificial means.
Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
Once one enters the realm of complex, high-technology medical care, it is hard to
shed the "emotional symbolism" of food .... Analytically, artificial feeding by
means of a nasogastric tube ... can be seen as equivalent to artificial breathing by
means of a respirator. Both prolong life through mechanical means when the body
is no longer able to perform a vital bodily function on its own.
In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (N.J. 1985). See also, e.g., Norman J. Cantor, The
Permanently Unconscious Patient, Non-Feeding and Euthanasia, 15 Am. J.L. & MED. 381
(1989); Joanne Lynn & James F. Childress, Must Patients Always Be Given Food and Water?, 13
HAsTINGs CENTER REP. 17 (1983). Nevertheless, some courts and commentators appear to reject
this contention and treat artificially provided nutrition and hydration differently from other life
supportive measures.
[C]ommon sense tells us that food and water do not treat an illness, they maintain a
life .... [T]his is not a case in which we are asked to let someone die .... This is a
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person in a permanent vegetative state will cause the person to die natu-
rally from their underlying disease within ten to fourteen days, without
suffering any feelings of pain, thirst, or hunger.23
The Florida statute defines "persistent vegetative state" in a manner
consistent with the definition endorsed in the reports of an expert task
force on the subject.24 Chapter 765, pertaining to health care advance
directives, also contains a provision expressly describing the rights and
interests of individuals in PVS that implicitly recognizes the grim reality
of this condition's prognosis: Even for persons in PVS who have no
advance directive, for whom there is no evidence indicating their wishes
under the circumstances, and for whom no one is willing to serve as a
health care proxy, physicians may withdraw life support whenever a
court-appointed guardian concludes, with the concurrence of a physician
and a hospital ethics committee, that there is no reasonable medical
probability for recovery and that withdrawing life-prolonging proce-
dures is in the patient's best interest.25 Thus, the Florida legislature,
through the enactment of this statutory provision, appeared to contem-
plate the possibility that providing artificial support to a person in PVS
who has not expressly requested such treatment may offer no genuine
benefit to the patient.
case in which we are asked to allow the medical profession to make Nancy die by
starvation and dehydration.
Cruzan v. Harman, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412, 423 (Mo. 1988), aff'd, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). See, e.g.,
In re Warren, 858 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing the Missouri Supreme Court
opinion in Cruzan with approval). A recent statement by Pope John Paul II, apparently made in
response to the Theresa Schiavo case, seemingly adopts the same position. The papal statement to
the conference of the World Federation of Catholic Medical Associations concludes that the
removal of a feeding tube from a person in PVS is immoral and constitutes "euthanasia by
omission" because providing food and water is natural, ordinary, and proportionate care and not
artificial medical intervention.
I should like particularly, to underline how the administration of water and food,
even when provided by artificial means, always represents a natural means of
preserving life, not a medical act. Its use, furthermore, should be considered, in
principle, ordinary and proportionate, and as such morally obligatory, insofar as and
until it is seen to have attained its proper finality, which in the present case consists
in providing nourishment to the patient and alleviation of his suffering.
Pope John Paul 1I, Speech Before the Participants at the International Congress, "Life Sustaining
Treatments and Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and Ethical Dilemmas," Mar. 20, 2004, at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/speeches/2004/march/documents/hf-jp-ii-spe-
20040320_congress-fiamc.en.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
23. See PVS Report (pt. 2), supra note 4, at 1578.
24. See PVS Report (pt. 1), supra note 2, at 1500-01. In Florida, a persistent vegetative state
is "a permanent and irreversible condition of unconsciousness in which there is: (a) The absence
of voluntary action or cognitive behavior of any kind. (b) An inability to communicate or interact
purposefully with the environment." FLA. STAT. ch. 765.101(12) (2003).
25. See FLA. STAT. ch. 765.404 (2004). For more about the problematic aspects of a "best
interests" standard in this context, see infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
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III. TURNING THE SCHIAVO CASE INTO A POLITICAL FOOTBALL
On September 17, 2003, a Florida court broke the deadlock
between Michael Schiavo and Theresa's parents, ordering Theresa's
feeding tube removed, and, four weeks later, the hospice providing her
care complied with this order. Less than one week after that, the Florida
legislature took the extraordinary step of intervening in the case by
enacting special legislation that granted the Governor fifteen days in
which to order a "stay" of the court's decision.26 Governor Jeb Bush
immediately acted on that authority, directing health care providers to
reinsert the tube so that Theresa Schiavo could resume artificial nutrition
and hydration. Of course, in this case the term "stay" is really a misno-
mer as it does not refer to a temporary delay to allow the courts to con-
sider additional evidence about the merits of their decision. The special
legislation did include a provision requiring the appointment of a guard-
ian ad litem to represent Theresa's interests and to provide advice to the
Governor about how to proceed after issuing the "stay."2 7 Because the
guardian failed to persuade Governor Bush to relent, however, the "stay"
will remain in effect indefinitely. At this point it is inconceivable that
the Governor would order the feeding tube removed again. Thus, the
legislation left the ultimate judgment about this issue with a non-judicial
actor, and the gubernatorial order amounted to a permanent overruling
of the court's final order.
Michael Schiavo immediately filed a challenge to the constitution-
ality of the legislature's action and the intervention of the executive
branch. The Governor responded with a series of procedural maneu-
vers, beginning with a motion to dismiss the constitutional claims on the
26. See H. B. 35E, 2003 Leg., Spec. Sess. E (Fla. 2003); 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 418. The
pertinent part of the legislation provides that:
(1) The Governor shall have the authority to issue a one-time stay to prevent the
withholding of nutrition and hydration from a patient if, as of October 15, 2003: (a)
That patient has no written advance directive; (b) The Court has found that patient
to be in a persistent vegetative state; (c) That patient has had nutrition and hydration
withheld; and (d) A member of that patient's family has challenged the withholding
of nutrition and hydration. (2) The Governor's authority to issue the stay expires 15
days after the effective date of this act, and the expiration of that authority does not
impact the validity or the effect of any stay issued pursuant to this act ....
Id. The bill is popularly known as "Terri's Law."
27. The appointed guardian assumed the unenviable task of meeting with the interested
parties and with physicians providing Theresa's care. Although he concluded that the situation
was medically hopeless and that the court's order to terminate support was "firmly grounded
within Florida statutory and case law," he was unable to sway the Governor. See Jay Wolfson, A
Report to Governor Jeb Bush in the Matter of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Dec. 1, 2003, at 34, at
http://www.miami.edulethics2/shiavo/wolfson's report.pdf (this cite can be found through a link in
Key Events, supra note 6); also at http://www.myflorida.commyflorida/governorsoffice/
reviewyear/docs/wolfson.pdf.
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grounds that the case did not conform with the technical requirements
relating to venue and service of legal documents, a move apparently
designed to delay judicial resolution of the constitutional challenges.28
Governor Bush also invited a prominent right-to-life attorney to serve as
lead counsel in the defense of the special legislation,2 9 prompting com-
mentators to speculate about the not-so-hidden conservative religious
and political agendas behind his decision to intervene. Meanwhile, the
American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ), a pro-life group estab-
lished by Christian Coalition founder Pat Robertson, allied itself with
Theresa Schiavo's parents, offering to assist their attorney in defending
the constitutionality of "Terri's Law." 3
0
Elected officials in Florida take an oath to abide by the state consti-
tution. Without pausing to offer any serious defense of the legislation's
constitutionality at the time of enactment, the Governor proceeded to
intervene in Theresa's case, claiming that he did what he thought was
right.31 Governor Bush even garnered praise from his brother the Presi-
dent.32 Nevertheless, the legislative and executive branch meddling in
28. See Abby Goodnough, Florida Governor Seeks to Toss Out Suit on Feeding Tube, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at A28; William R. Levesque, Terri's Law Defender Lashes Out, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 6, 2003, at 1B. Attorneys for the Governor also attempted to force the
judge assigned to hear the constitutional challenge to recuse himself on the grounds of "bias"
because he had previously ruled that it was ethically and legally appropriate to remove the feeding
tube based on the facts at trial. See Bush v. Schiavo, 861 So. 2d 506 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
29. See Levesque, supra note 28 (describing the lead counsel, Ken Connor, as a "leader in
Florida's fight-to-life movement" and former president of the Family Research Counsel, a
Washington think tank).
30. See William R. Levesque, Terri Schiavo's Parents Seek Stake in Lawsuit, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at lB (quoting the ACLJ chief counsel, who has opined that
the Schiavo case is "no different" from a situation in which the Governor uses his acknowledged
authority to intervene to save the life of someone on death row). Although Florida's Constitution
expressly grants clemency power to the governor, see FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8, it contains no such
provision authorizing gubernatorial intervention in end-of-life disputes.
31. According to Governor Bush, "[t]his was the right thing to do and the courts will make
the determination. It's on appeal as I understand it and they'll make the determination of the
constitutionality but we did what was right and I'm proud of the legislature for responding." CNN
NewsNight with Aaron Brown (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 23, 2003) (transcript #
102300CN.V84 available on LEXIS); see also Linda Kleindienst, Bush's Schiavo Intervention
Has Political Tinges, Analysts Say, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Laud.), Oct. 25, 2003, at IA (quoting the
Governor who stated, "I did what I thought was right . . I think life is innocent. Life is
precious.").
32. See David E. Sanger, Bush Backs His Brother's Decision in Feeding Tube Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2003, at A23 (noting that the President made his supportive remarks in a speech in
which he also reiterated his intention to sign a bill banning "partial-birth abortion," sending
reassurance to his conservative supporters on key issues). Occasionally, judges facing difficult
medical treatment decisions have offered similar justifications for trampling on patient's rights to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. For instance, Judge Skelly Wright famously offered the
following justification for ordering an emergency blood transfusion over the express refusal of a
woman who was a member of the Jehovah's Witness faith: "[A] life hung in the balance. There
was no time for research and reflection .. . .To refuse to act, only to find later that the law
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this case smacks of political expediency and hypocrisy. These events
strongly suggest that the conservative religious right is seeking to
impose its beliefs on Theresa Schiavo who, the courts have concluded,
would prefer to die under these circumstances.3 3 Imagine instead a mir-
ror image situation: Theresa Schiavo's parents prevail in the courts,
forcing the continuation of artificial life support, notwithstanding her
husband's claim that she had previously expressed wishes to refuse care
under these circumstances. Not satisfied with this outcome, Theresa
Schiavo's husband somehow persuades the legislature to intervene and
to grant the Governor the authority to reverse the court's conclusion and
order the removal of life support. The constitutional objections to such a
series of events remain the same. Even so, the very groups that vocally
applauded the legislative intervention in the Schiavo case would be cry-
ing foul under these circumstances. 34
A. Separation of Powers Objections
The legislative action and the Governor's blithe decision to over-
turn the court order raise significant constitutional questions and should
not survive appeal.35 An inquiry into one structural infirmity in the leg-
islation suffices to demonstrate its unconstitutionality. Unlike its federal
required action, was a risk I was unwilling to accept. I determined to act on the side of life." In re
President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1009-10 (D.C. Cir. 1964). There is
much to criticize in Judge Wright's reasoning, but Governor Bush does not even have the
emergency situation to justify his actions because the decision to remove Theresa Schiavo's
feeding tube was the result of lengthy "research and reflection" resulting in a final determination
by several courts that the removal was consistent with her wishes.
33. It is important to acknowledge that judicial fact-finding and conclusions in these sorts of
cases represent an imperfect method of resolving questions of an incompetent patient's wishes.
The Governor and the legislature have suggested that where there is even a scintilla of doubt about
the patient's wishes regarding the refusal of life-sustaining treatment (which the Schindlers
vehemently argue there is), one should "err on the side of life" and continue with treatment. See
Statement By: Governor Jeb Bush Guardian Ad Litem's Report (Dec. 2, 2003), at http://sun6.dms.
state.fl.us/eog-new/eog/library/releases/2003/December/litems-report- 2-2-03.html (this cite can
also be found through a link in Key Events, supra note 6). Adopting "err on the side of life" as the
default position in the end of life context, however, penalizes the many who do not share that
view; it seems probable that fewer mistakes would be made in individual cases if the system
adopted no default position, but instead made the best decision possible with the facts available.
34. Randall Terry, the pro-life activist leader of Operation Rescue, was purportedly "ecstatic"
in an interview on CNN, expressing delight that finally "an executive and a legislative body stood
up to judicial tyranny." See Jonathan Turley, Terri Schiavo: Constitution Anticipated Such Hard
Cases, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 3, 2003, at 13A (observing that, "when legislatures have
passed bills on subjects such as abortion rights or same-sex unions, [Mr.] Terry has denounced
them as 'godless' and led calls for court challenges").
35. It is worth remembering that the current litigation involves a challenge to the
constitutionality of the legislative and executive efforts to overrule the final judicial decision, not
to the merits of that decision. The Governor now is attempting to revisit judicial findings of fact
in the decision to order removal of life support, but, because the Governor was not an interested
party in those proceedings, the courts should resist these efforts.
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counterpart, Florida's constitution includes a provision that expressly
requires maintaining the separation of powers among the three branches
of government.36 Classically legislative actions are those that have gen-
eral application and prospective effect, 37 not those that are targeted and
retroactive. In this respect, the Schiavo legislation's format-its specific-
ity taken together with its retroactivity-constitutes a dead giveaway that
the legislature is not legislating anymore but rather engaging in an activ-
ity that is classically judicial. Generally speaking, it is the role of courts
to resolve particular disputes, while legislatures are charged with creat-
ing laws of general application and prospective effect, and executive
officers are charged with implementing these laws. Although these cate-
gories of authority overlap and blend in numerous ways, it would be
difficult to argue in this case that the legislative intervention was consti-
tutionally acceptable. A legislature may not grant an executive officer,
such as the governor, powers that are properly viewed as judicial.
The Florida legislature expressly provided that the judiciary must
settle controversies about whether patients who lack decisional capacity
would choose to decline life-sustaining treatment.38 In this case, numer-
ous courts have confirmed the guardianship court's initial conclusion
that Theresa Schiavo would choose to refuse continued life support
under these circumstances, and the matter had been litigated to its con-
clusion, culminating in a final order to remove her feeding tube.39 The
legislature, dissatisfied with the courts' conclusions in this particular
case, intervened by handing the Governor the authority to interfere with
this final judicial determination, in violation of Florida's constitutional
requirement of separation of powers. As the United States Supreme
Court has ruled, Congress may not intrude upon judicial proceedings, no
matter what the reason, and the same principle applies at the state level
36. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("The powers of the state government shall be divided into
legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any
powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein."); see also
id. art. I, § 10 ("No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed."). Moreover, Florida's case law interpreting this explicit separation of powers
provision strongly supports a strict application of the doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Cotton, 769 So.
2d 345, 353 (Fla. 2000); Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1991).
37. See Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1055, 1057 (1997) (explaining that the "general principle that statutes operate
prospectively and judicial decisions apply retroactively is a matter of black letter law").
38. See FLA. STAT. ch. 765.105 (2004) (providing that the patient's family, the health care
facility, and other interested parties may seek expedited judicial intervention if the person believes
that the surrogate or proxy's decision is not in accord with the patient's known wishes, that the
surrogate or proxy has failed to discharge his/her duties or has abused powers).
39. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re
Guardianship of Schiavo, 800 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); In re Guardianship of
Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So.
2d 176, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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in Florida.40
Of course, the resolution of disputes with respect to end-of-life
treatment hardly represents an inherently judicial function. Resolution
in the courts may not represent the optimal approach to dealing with
such conflicts; in fact, courts in Florida and elsewhere have acknowl-
edged that such matters ideally should be resolved outside of the judicial
system.4' As of now, however, the statute indisputably lodges primary
decisional authority with the Florida courts, and the legislature cannot
ignore this established decision-making scheme on an ad hoc basis,
especially not after the judicial process has run its course. If the consti-
tution does not regard the resolution of end-of-life disputes as an inher-
ently judicial function, then the legislature retains the discretion to
amend the statute to remove this authority from the courts. In light of
this concession, could the legislature defend "Terri's Law" on the basis
that its greater power to remove all authority over end-of-life disputes
from the judiciary includes the lesser power to revoke such authority in a
particular dispute? Courts generally have rejected such greater-includes-
the-lesser arguments in various constitutional settings,42 and the statute
delegated full authority to the courts without reservation, so it would
contravene the enacting legislature's design to allow piecemeal revoca-
tions of that power.43
40. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995) ("Having achieved finality
... a judicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular
case or controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law
applicable to that very case was something other than what the courts said it was."). Supporters of
the legislative override of the judicial determination in the Schiavo case might attempt a more
sophisticated defense of its constitutionality by suggesting that the separation of powers argument
in this case is excessively formalistic. Those taking a functionalist approach generally argue
against bright line delineations of authority, suggesting instead that it is more appropriate to
balance on an ad hoc basis the competing policy concerns in a given case by asking whether the
apparent separation of powers violation genuinely threatens to unbalance the branches and
whether it promotes a sufficiently weighty goal. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous
Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1732-44 (1996) (describing and discussing the two styles of
separation of powers analysis); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to
Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 510-26
(1987) (comparing two cases representing formal and functional approaches to separation of
powers analysis). Nevertheless, it seems likely that even a diehard functionalist would find this
legislation difficult to defend because it involves the usurpation of another branch's function,
rather than a give-away of power to another branch, and it serves no plausible public purpose.
41. See infra note 100 and accompanying text (briefly discussing an alternative, non-judicial
approach).
42. See Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater Powers: A
Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371, 519 (1995) (arguing that, although the greater-
includes-the-lesser argument makes some sense, heightened judicial scrutiny is appropriate in
cases where the lesser power is separated from the greater power along a constitutionally
protected dimension); John H. Garvey, The Powers and the Duties of Government, 26 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 209, 215-19 (1989) (commenting on the limitations of this argument).
43. Along a similar line, could the legislature amend Chapter 765 of the Florida statutes to
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Private legislation also does not invariably offend federal or state
constitutional principles. No provision in the U.S. Constitution gener-
ally prohibits private bills.' In fact, Congress frequently enacts special
bills designed to affect individual rights retroactively, particularly in the
context of immigration claims, but these bills typically provide a benefit
to the individual rather than imposing a detriment."a In contrast, Flor-
ida's constitution expressly prohibits most types of "special laws,"46
though not surprisingly it fails to mention issues of guardianship or end-
of-life decision-making.
Because the Florida courts have repeatedly concluded that Theresa
would not wish to continue artificial support under these circumstances,
it seems unlikely that she would perceive this legislation as providing
her with a benefit. Johnnie Byrd, Jr., the Speaker of the Florida House
of Representatives, took a purposefully naive position on this question in
his amicus brief in support of the legislation he helped craft:
Nothing on the face of [Terri's Law] questions the propriety or
authority of the determination of how chapter 765 and the constitu-
tional right to privacy applied to Terri Schiavo's situation at the time
of Judge Greer's decision to withdraw and withhold nutrition and
hydration. Instead, [the statute] adds new protections to the right to
life of Terri Schiavo and other incompetents whose deaths by dehy-
dration and starvation had been judicially ordered and approved
47
create an end-of-life dispute resolution scheme in which courts initially hear and decide these
cases but the legislature expressly retains the authority to override individual judicial decisions
with which it disagrees? Cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952-55 (1983) (invalidating on
bicameralism and presentment grounds a legislative veto in a statute delegating to the U.S.
Attorney General the authority to waive statutory deportation requirements in certain cases while
retaining for one chamber of Congress the power to override this partial delegation of authority in
individual cases).
44. The U.S. Constitution does, however, forbid two particular categories of private bills. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (bills of attainder); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (titles of nobility).
45. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REv. 561,
609-10 (2001) (explaining that Congress possesses the authority to enact private bills and "has
traditionally exercised that power in granting people immigration status and allowing individuals
to press financial claims against the federal government"); cf. Sharona Hoffman, A Proposal for
Federal Legislation to Address Health Insurance Coverage for Experimental and Investigational
Treatments, 78 OR. L. REV. 203, 240 (1999) (describing special state legislation intervening in a
health insurance contract coverage dispute to provide insurance benefits to a child with cancer
over the objections of the insurer).
46. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 11. The state constitution does permit the Florida legislature to
enact special claims bills designed to compensate victims of state employee negligence who
would otherwise have no remedy because of rules of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., 2002 Fla.
Laws ch. 307; 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 346; see also Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional
Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, Ill HARV. L. REV.
1381 (1998) (exploring history of legislative determination of claims against the government).
47. Brief of Amicus Speaker of the House on the Issue of Separation of Powers at 4, Schiavo
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While apparently conceding that the courts got it right under the applica-
ble law at the time the dispute was litigated, he wonders, in effect, "Who
could possibly object to giving someone more rights than they had
before?"
B. Other Constitutional Objections
In addition to its structural constitutional flaws, the legislation
interferes with Theresa's individual constitutional rights. Before she lost
decisional capacity, Theresa made statements that, as the courts have
confirmed, met the standard at the time for an incompetent to refuse
additional life sustaining treatment. The legislature's action applies ret-
roactively, 48 changing the rules that Theresa may have relied on, in vio-
lation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process.4 9
This lack of notice creates an unfair surprise for the parties in the case.
In another recent case examining the constitutionality of a retroactive
statute, a Florida court upheld retroactive legislation forbidding the pub-
lication of autopsy photographs (including those of the already dead
NASCAR legend Dale Earnhardt) despite the general right of access and
publication to autopsy records under state public records laws.5" Unlike
the Schiavo legislation, however, the statute enacted in response to the
media's attempt to publish Earnhardt's autopsy photographs not only
v. Bush, 2004 WL 980028 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2004) (No. 03-008212-CI-20), available at www.lldf.org/
byrdamicusI 1 1003.pdf.
48. Courts generally disfavor retroactivity in legislation. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 U.S. 244, 264-80 (1994); United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30-31 (1994); Fisch, supra
note 37, at 1065-66 (explaining that the Supreme Court has "reaffirmed the presumption against
retroactivity" and that this presumption "'is founded upon sound considerations of general policy
and practice, and accords with long held and widely shared expectations about the usual operation
of legislation'" (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 286)). Nevertheless, retroactive legislation is
permissible if its purpose is remedial-that is, if it is intended to remedy a problem or redress an
injury-and if it does not interfere with a vested private right.
49. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. What if, after Theresa had entered PVS but before the
litigation to remove her life support began, the legislature had amended the statute to require a
written advance directive in all cases in order to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from a
person in PVS? Such a scenario would remove the separation of powers concerns discussed
above and would instead raise a pure retroactivity question-whether application of the
hypothetical statute to Theresa improperly interferes with due process in her case. Then, the court
hearing the Schiavo case would have to determine whether Theresa Schiavo actually relied on the
previous version of the statute (that did not require written advance directives). In the alternative,
what if Theresa actually had an advance directive that was executed consistent with the statute at
the time, but the legislature amended the statute to require two witness signatures and notarization
in order to make the written instructions valid? In this latter scenario, the fact that she had
executed an advance directive consistent with the statute at the time (before she lost capacity)
would appear to indicate reliance.
50. See Campus Communications, Inc. v. Earnhardt, 821 So. 2d 388, 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2002) (concluding that retroactive legislation forbidding the publication of autopsy photographs
did not impair a vested individual right of a media outlet to inspect, copy, and publish public
autopsy records under Florida public records laws).
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applied retroactively but also prospectively to all similar future situa-
tions,5 ' and it interfered with a public rather than a private right.52 In
contrast, "Terri's Law" was drafted to apply only in Theresa's case, the
authority it handed to the Governor expired after fifteen days rather than
applying to all future cases, and it impaired her private right to due pro-
cess, all characteristics that should raise red flags in retroactivity
analysis.
Governor Bush is not the first state official to intervene in a family
dispute over the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from a
patient in a permanent vegetative state, and he probably will not be the
last.53 Although the special legislation designed to address the Theresa
Schiavo dispute appears to be the first of its kind in the end-of-life set-
ting, the Virginia legislature flirted with a similar intervention in the
mid-1990s. In this remarkably similar case, Hugh Finn, a forty-four-
year-old former television newscaster languished in a permanent vegeta-
tive state after an automobile accident severely injured his brain. Three
years after the accident, his wife, Michele Finn, concluded that he would
not wish to be kept alive by artificial means under the circumstances.
When she notified Mr. Finn's family that she intended to ask the nursing
facility caring for her husband to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion, the family objected and filed suit. The trial court confirmed that
the medical testimony presented clear and convincing evidence of Mr.
Finn's vegetative state, that Michele Finn and others had presented cred-
ible testimony that withdrawal of support would be Mr. Finn's wish, and
that Virginia law permitted the withdrawal of support in the
51. See FLA. STAT. ch. 406.135 (2004).
52. See Earnhardt, 821 So. 2d at 400.
53. In another case of this sort, a state attorney general intervened to prevent a mother from
withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration from her adult son who had been permanently
unconscious for over twenty years. See Dale L. Moore, Afterword: The Case of Daniel Joseph
Fiori, 57 ALB. L. REv. 811 (1994) (criticizing the Attorney General's persistent opposition to the
mother's decision). The state supreme court ultimately agreed that the patient's mother retained
the right to request treatment withdrawal based on her understanding of what her son would have
wanted under the circumstances. See In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996). For another startling
example of well-intentioned meddling in an end-of-life dispute, though by a private citizen rather
than a government official, see In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1991) (concluding that the
probate court erred in appointing a temporary guardian for Ms. Lawrance because her family
retained the legal authority to decide whether to remove her feeding tube). See also In re Mullins,
649 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. 1995) (reprimanding the lawyer who intervened in the Sue Ann Lawrance
case because she was not an "interested party," and for unprofessional conduct in attempting to
interfere with the guardianship by forming the "Christian Fellowship for the Disabled" that sought
emergency guardianship in order to prevent the removal of her feeding tube). Earlier cases also
generated strong emotions among members of the public. When the Missouri probate court
ultimately issued the order permitting the removal of Nancy Cruzan's feeding tube, pro-life
protesters attempted to storm her hospital room to reconnect the tube. See Associated Press,
Protesters Fail in Bid to Feed Dying Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1990, at D20.
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circumstances.54
While the litigation was pending, representatives from various Vir-
ginia state agencies and a member of the General Assembly made
"investigative visits" to the nursing home to "examine" Mr. Finn, appar-
ently at the behest of dissenting family members.55 Shortly after the trial
court entered its order, twenty members of the Virginia General Assem-
bly announced an "informal declaration" regarding the Finn case in
which they stated that "the provision of comfort care as well as food and
water should not be denied patients where such removal will be the
underlying cause of death."56 A few days later, the Governor of Vir-
ginia filed a separate lawsuit against the nursing home, Mr. Finn's phy-
sician, and Michele Finn, seeking a permanent injunction forbidding
removal of the feeding tube. 7 Boiled down to its essence, the Gover-
nor's complaint contended that withdrawal of artificial support would be
the cause of Hugh Finn's death, rather than his underlying condition,
and that because Virginia law forbids euthanasia, the court should issue
the injunction. 58 The trial court denied the Governor's request and
awarded attorneys' fees and court costs to Michele Finn.59
Other legislatures, including Congress, have happily meddled in
similar sorts of family disputes, with equally disturbing results. A recent
federal decision in a child custody case offers some instructive parallels
to the Schiavo dispute. Dr. Eric Foretich and his wife Dr. Jean Morgan
separated while Jean was pregnant with their daughter Hilary, and they
divorced shortly after her birth.6" The D.C. Superior Court awarded cus-
tody to Dr. Morgan and generous visitation to Dr. Foretich, but Dr. Mor-
gan repeatedly refused to comply with the visitation orders, claiming
that Dr. Foretich and his parents had sexually abused Hilary. The courts
never found any evidence of abuse and continued to reaffirm the visita-
54. See Gilmore v. Finn, 527 S.E.2d 426 (Va. 2000).
55. See id. at 456-57 (explaining that these visits occurred without the knowledge or consent
of Michele Finn).
56. See id.
57. See id. at 457-58 (explaining that the Governor's complaint asserted that he was acting
"pursuant to his duty to protect or preserve the general welfare of the citizens of the
Commonwealth ...where he shall determine that existing legal procedures fail to adequately
protect existing legal rights and interests of such citizens").
58. See id. As explained above, this position directly contradicts the view of numerous
physicians, medical ethicists, courts and legislatures that artificial nutrition and hydration provided
through a tube is no different than other types of technological life-supportive measures. See
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
59. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court's decision including its
determination to decline Michele Finn's request for punitive sanctions against the Governor,
concluding that the Governor had acted in good faith and that his assertions were not totally
without merit. See Gilmore, 527 S.E.2d at 462, 467.
60. See Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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tion orders on Dr. Foretich's behalf. Ultimately, Dr. Morgan served
time in jail for contempt of court (for keeping Hilary from her father),
after which she then fled with Hilary to New Zealand. At Dr. Morgan's
request, Congress intervened in the dispute and passed the Elizabeth
Morgan Act, which enabled Dr. Morgan and her daughter to return to
the United States without being subject to orders from the D.C. Superior
Court, and which prevented Dr. Foretich from visitation with his daugh-
ter unless the daughter consented. Like the Florida legislature's inter-
vention in the Theresa Schiavo case, the Elizabeth Morgan Act
pretended to be neutral, referring to "any pending case involving cus-
tody over a minor child," but its other provisions, taken together, can
refer only to the Morgan/Foretich custody dispute.6'
Dr. Foretich challenged the Act as an unconstitutional bill of attain-
der and a violation of due process and separation of powers. 62  The
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluded that the
Act was a bill of attainder, explaining that the constitutional prohibition
on such bills was intended to serve as "a general safeguard against legis-
lative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply- trial by legisla-
ture."'63  Thus, the court understood the Bill of Attainder clause as
reinforcing separation of powers principles in the United States
Constitution.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Bill of Attainder clause as
prohibiting laws that (1) apply with specificity and (2) impose punish-
ment.6 Because the Elizabeth Morgan Act was drafted to cover an
exceedingly narrow set of circumstances that could only apply to the
Morgan/Foretich custody dispute, the D.C. Circuit readily concluded
that there was "no serious dispute that the ... Act satisfies the specific-
ity prong of [the Bill of Attainder] analysis. 65 With respect to the ques-
tion of whether the Act imposes punishment, the court concluded that
61. Id. at 1207. The Elizabeth Morgan Act did not apply except under the following
circumstances: (1) the minor child in a pending custody dispute has attained 13 years of age; (2)
the child has resided outside the United States for not less than 24 consecutive months; (3) any
party to the case has denied custody or visitation to another party in violation of a court order for
not less than 24 consecutive months; (4) any party to the case has lived outside of the District of
Columbia during that period of denial of custody or visitation; and (5) the child has asserted that a
party to the case has been sexually abusive with him or her. Id.
62. Id. at 1208-09. The United States Constitution provides that "[n]o Bill of Attainder...
shall be passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
63. Foretich, 351 F.3d at 1216 (quoting United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965)).
64. See id. at 1217 (citing BellSouth v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Although
the bill of attainder clause initially was understood to refer to legislative acts that sentenced
particular defendants to death without a judicial trial, the Supreme Court quickly expanded the
scope of the clause to include "[t]he deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously
enjoyed." See id. (citing Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 320 (1866)).
65. Foretich, 351 F.3d at 1217.
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the legislation evinced no legitimate non-punitive purpose and that it
instead "inflict[ed] significant and costly injury to Dr. Foretich's reputa-
tion, while... [taking]... a significant step toward permanently severing
Dr. Foretich's relationship with his own daughter. '66 The court also
relied on the legislative history of the Act, which included numerous
statements regarding the congressional intent to "correct an injustice" in
the custody dispute.67
Although the Florida legislation dealing with Theresa Schiavo's
case also would appear to satisfy the specificity requirement for an
unconstitutional bill of attainder,68 it is less obvious whether "Terri's
Law" imposes the same degree of "punishment" on Michael Schiavo in
the form of injury to reputation that the Elizabeth Morgan Act accom-
plished. At the very least, "Terri's Law" appears to question Michael
Schiavo's motivations, implicitly endorsing the Schindlers' claims that
Michael Schiavo has sought permission to withdraw artificial support
for his own convenience. In other respects, however, the two cases
share remarkable similarities and trigger comparable constitutional
misgivings.
The constitutional challenge to Terri's Law is now winding its way
through the courts. On May 6, 2004, the Florida Sixth Judicial Circuit
issued an order granting summary judgment to Michael Schiavo, con-
cluding that "there is ample undisputed record evidence ... to conclu-
sively demonstrate the unconstitutionality of [the legislation] ... both on
its face and as applied to Mrs. Schiavo. ' '69  The opinion adopted a
"kitchen sink" approach to its constitutional analysis of the legislation
and in several instances appeared to overstate or mischaracterize the
facts of the case.70  Nevertheless, the reviewing court correctly con-
66. Id. at 1223.
67. See id. at 1225-26. In fact, the government conceded during the litigation over the Act's
constitutionality that the Act was directed solely at Dr. Foretich. See id. at 1204.
68. For an analysis of these and other objections to proposed federal legislation withdrawing
the license of an abortifacient, see Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug Approval Process?:
Mifepristone Embroils the FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 571, 594-99
(2001). The state constitution tracks the federal constitution in this regard. See FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 10 ("No bill of attainder ... shall be passed.").
69. See Schiavo v. Bush, No. 03-008212-CI-20, 2004 WL 980028, *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 5,
2004).
70. For example, the opinion describes the special legislation as containing "nothing to
provide the Governor with any direction or guidelines for the exercise of this delegated authority,"
which ignores the requirement in the statute that the Governor consult with an independent
guardian. See id. at *3. Of course, the guardian's recommendations, in reality, would be unlikely
to influence the Governor unless they happened to coincide with Mr. Bush's own views.
Similarly, the court appears to overstate the claim that deciding disputes of this sort represents a
[Vol. 59:107
POLITICIZING THE END OF LIFE
cluded that the legislation is unconstitutional. With respect to the sepa-
ration of powers analysis, the court noted that "a final judgment of a
court case cannot be undone by legislation as to parties before the court"
and that "the prohibition against intrusion into judicial functions by leg-
islation also applies to executive branch encroachment."71 The review-
ing court also concluded that the legislation violates Theresa's
substantive rights under the state constitution's explicit privacy
provision.72
The Florida Supreme Court granted a request for expedited review,
over the vocal objections of the Governor.73 On September 23, 2004,
this court confirmed the trial court's conclusion that the special legisla-
tion is unconstitutional, focusing exclusively on state separation of pow-
ers analysis.74 The court's opinion begins with the observation that the
legislation and the ensuing gubernatorial stay interfere with a final judi-
cial order, in violation of the Florida Constitution's separation of powers
provision.75 In addition, the court observed that the legislation inappro-
priately delegates legislative authority to the Governor. Noting that
"Terri's Law" provides no criteria to guide the Governor, either in issu-
ing the stay or in deciding to lift it, the court roundly rejected the Gover-
nor's contention that his decision-making discretion is in fact limited by
the provisions of Chapter 765.76 Unfortunately, although the court cor-
core judicial function. See id. at *7 (the "executive order . . . constitut[ed] a forbidden
encroachment upon the power that has been reserved for the independent judiciary" and "the
Governor interfered with the court's prior final adjudication of Mrs. Schiavo's rights through the
exercise of powers textually assigned by the Constitution to the judiciary"); see also infra notes
41-43 and accompanying text (discussing the question of whether resolving such disputes
represents an essential judicial function).
71. See Schiavo, 2004 WL 980028 at *7. Curiously, the court characterizes the separation of
powers violation as an "as applied" rather than a "facial" constitutional flaw. Nothing about the
separation of powers analysis appears to depend on the facts of this particular case, however, and
it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which this legislation would not be unconstitutional on
these grounds.
72. See id. at *3-5.
73. See Abby Goodnough, Top State Court to Hear Feeding-Tube Case, N.Y. TasS, June 17,
2004, at A24 (reporting that the Florida Supreme Court voted 4-3 to hear the case and has
scheduled oral argument for August 31, 2004). Attorneys for Governor Bush continued in their
attempts to delay resolution of the constitutional question, requesting that the court delay
additional action pending a resolution of its challenge to Michael Schiavo's guardianship
authority. See Documents in the Schiavo Cases, at http://www.flcourts.org/pubinfo/schiavo/
index.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2004) (providing additional examples of briefs filed in an
apparent attempt to delay the oral argument).
74. See Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004). On January 24, 2005, in response to a
petition by the Florida Governor, the United States Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari.
75. See id. at 331 ("[T]he Act, as applied in this case, resulted in an executive order that
effectively reversed a properly rendered final judgment and thereby constituted an
unconstitutional encroachment on the power that has been reserved for the independent
judiciary.").
76. See id. at 334.
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rectly concludes that the legislation violates Florida's separation of pow-
ers provisions, it leaves a number of important questions unanswered.
For example, the opinion does not address the more complex questions
of whether the resolution of end-of-life disputes constitutes an inherently
judicial function, or whether the legislature could withdraw this function
from the courts by amending Chapter 765 with respect to future cases.7 7
C. Ethical Implications
The special legislation in the Schiavo case represents an unwar-
ranted and irresponsible interference with an individual citizen's right to
make autonomous medical decisions. Apart from its constitutional fail-
ings, the Governor's intervention flies in the face of the now well-settled
right of individuals to refuse life-sustaining treatment. The Florida
courts, after careful consideration of testimony from Theresa Schiavo's
friends and family, concluded that continued treatment would be incon-
sistent with her preferences and, therefore, ethically inappropriate. On
the other side, Theresa's parents and those groups which have adopted
their cause hold equally vehement, emotional views about the ethical
propriety of continuing to provide Theresa with artificial nutrition and
hydration, disputing the court's conclusions about her wishes and assert-
ing that withdrawal of support constitutes a form of euthanasia. Rather
than respecting the court's confirmation of Theresa Schiavo's wishes in
this situation, the state government has opted instead to substitute its
own judgment about what is right as an ethical matter, as well as choos-
ing to contest important findings of fact regarding Theresa's diagnosis
and prognosis.78
One might also question the legislature's true motivations79 in light
[Tlhe Act does not refer to the provisions of chapter 765 ... [and] does not amend
[the section] which sets forth an order of priority for determining who should act as
proxy for an incapacitated patient who has no advance directive. Nor does the Act
require that the Governor's decision be made in conformity with the requirement...
that the proxy's decision be based on 'the decision the proxy reasonably believes
that patient would have made under the circumstances' or, if there is no indication
of what the patient would have chosen, in the patient's best interests.
Id.
77. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing these questions).
78. Her husband's attorney likens the state's actions to a kidnapping in the midst of the dying
process-a monstrous meddling with her right of bodily integrity. See Hugo Kugiya, After Fight,
Tube's Back; Comatose Woman Rehydrating, NEWSDAY, Oct. 23, 2003, at A6 (reporting that
Michael Schiavo's attorney, George Felos, "[c]haracterized the governor's order as a sanctioned
kidnapping").
79. On the relevance of such motivations in resolving constitutional challenges, see Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977) ("The legislative or
administrative history may be highly relevant [in determining whether discriminatory intent
existed], especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking
body."); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297,
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of the numerous pronouncements made during the pre-enactment debate
about the sanctity of life and the will of Floridians. More than a few
commentators have observed that the decision to intervene in the
Schiavo case appeases vocal and politically powerful religious groups
who wielded tremendous clout in this election year. The Governor
earned high praise from Theresa's parents and various pro-life groups
for his actions, but others view his decision as one of political expedi-
ence cloaked in a mantle of concern for Theresa's welfare.80 Again,
interference by individuals or groups with a pro-life agenda into end-of-
life decision-making does not represent a new phenomenon, but it is
deeply troubling when such attempts succeed in overruling the apparent
wishes of the patient in question. Many individuals would find a
"majority-rule" approach to end-of-life decision-making repugnant,
especially if their preferences happen to differ from that of the current
majority.
If allowed to stand, this model of legislative intervention in individ-
ual medical decisions will have grave consequences for patients and
health care providers in Florida. Although this particular law was care-
fully tailored to address only Theresa Schiavo's circumstances, nothing
would prevent the Florida legislature from opting to use a similar mech-
anism to intervene in other sorts of cases, such as disputes about abor-
tion rights, decisions about organ and tissue donation, or disputes among
family members over appropriate medical treatment for a gravely ill
child. Imagine, for example, a scenario in which a pregnant woman
wishes to obtain a legal second-trimester abortion over the objection of
her husband. Can the aggrieved husband now seek legislative interven-
tion in the form of a special bill to prevent the abortion? Such a bill
would surely fail to survive constitutional scrutiny, 8 but, while the
courts review the legislation, the woman's pregnancy likely would pro-
gress beyond the point of viability, effectively removing the abortion
option. Recent events have placed the old assumptions about autono-
mous medical decision-making seriously in doubt.
Why has the Theresa Schiavo case caused such consternation?
Although the court's conclusion that Theresa herself, through the exer-
368-69 (1977) (concluding that the Court has increasingly and appropriately focused on the
legislature's motivations in resolving constitutional challenges).
80. Even if the Governor's decision to issue the "stay" was driven by genuine concern for
Theresa's welfare, good intentions fail to excuse such intrusions into the private, personal rights of
individuals. As Justice Louis Brandeis once wrote, "[t]he greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning, but without understanding." Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
81. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-77, 893-95 (1992) (defining "undue
burden" and rejecting a Pennsylvania statute requiring spousal notification prior to the termination
of a married woman's pregnancy).
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cise of her autonomous right to refuse unwanted medical care, would
have chosen to refuse the care, the dispute between Theresa's family
members at its root centers around an underlying confusion about the
concept of futility in medicine. In cases of scientific futility (also known
as physiologic futility), patients or their families demand treatments that
simply will not achieve the desired medical goal. Because physicians
readily can identify instances of scientific futility and generally can
explain to patients and families why a particular intervention is not
appropriate, discontinuing care based on scientific futility tends not to
pose difficult ethical problems." In contrast, in a case of ethical futility
(also known as qualitative futility), where treating physicians (or dis-
senting family members) believe that the quality of that life is so dimin-
ished that its continuation appears futile, patients or their families (or
pro-life legislators) continue to demand treatments that will accomplish
the medical goal of sustaining this qualitatively diminished life.83
Despite its judicial resolution on individual autonomy grounds, the
dispute over Theresa Schiavo's care rages on partly because the case
raises a question of ethical rather than scientific futility. No one can
argue, as a scientific matter, that the artificial nutrition and hydration
constitute an ineffective treatment; it "works" in the sense that it keeps
Theresa's body alive. Unfortunately, this vitalist view of life directly
conflicts with the uncomfortable perception that the quality of Theresa's
life renders continued treatment ethically inappropriate. As with
anencephalic infants,84 physicians caring for patients in a permanent
vegetative state frequently reach the conclusion that continuing with
tube feeding and other measures is ethically futile, despite the fact that
these interventions "work" to keep the patient alive.
Because judgments about ethical futility require inherently subjec-
tive assessments regarding "benefit" to the patient, it is important to
tread carefully when considering a conclusion that a particular interven-
82. The law does not require physicians to provide scientifically futile care. See Jerry
Menikoff, Demanded Medical Care, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1091, 1095 (1998) (discussing the classic
example of a patient demanding antibiotics to treat a viral infection).
83. See id. at 1097 (explaining that "[e]fforts to keep alive people who will not ever rise
above that minimum level [of permanent unconsciousness] are deemed to be futile," but noting
that "[t]he response to this argument is that no one ever empowered the medical profession to
decide what constitutes an adequate quality of life: that would constitute a pure value judgment").
Professor Menikoff also describes a third futility category-quantitative futility-which he defines
as involving "situations where the benefits of the treatment, should it succeed, would clearly be
worthwhile, but the probability of the treatment succeeding is very low." Id. at 1098.
84. In the case of Baby K, much of the ethical debate centered on the question of whether
physicians must provide medical care that they view as ethically inappropriate. See Annas, supra
note 10, at 1543-44; Elizabeth A. Larson, Did Congress Intend to Give Patients the Right to
Demand and Receive Inappropriate Medical Treatments?: EMTALA Reexamined in Light of Baby
K, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1425.
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tion for a particular patient is ethically futile. The touchstone principle
of autonomy reminds us that, whenever possible, the conclusion that
continued treatment represents an ethically futile choice should rest on
the individual patient's values, preferences, and beliefs.85 Can a best
interests analysis help to make these decisions in cases where evidence
of individual preference does not exist, or is equivocal? As the Baby K
case illustrated, debates about ethical futility raise vexing questions
about the appropriate limits of family authority to demand treatments
that physicians believe provide no genuine benefit to the patient.8 6 In
the case of an anencephalic infant like Stephanie, the decision-maker
obviously cannot inquire into individual preferences that never existed.
For that reason, most physicians and family members turn instead to a
benefits versus burdens calculus and conclude that continued treatment
is not in the baby's best interests given the prognosis.8 7
But what exactly is the nature of the burden of continued treatment
85. For an insightful discussion on these complex ethical concepts in theory and application,
see generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-
LIFE DECISIONMAKING (2004).
86. Taking an extreme position on this question, the federal district court in the Baby K
litigation opined that the hospital could not override Ms. Harrell's demands for treatment because
"[a] parent has a constitutionally protected right to 'bring up children' grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause." In re Baby "K," 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1030 (E.D. Va. 1993)
(citations omitted). Several other courts have refused to permit health care providers to
discontinue treatments over the objections of family members. See, e.g., In re Wanglie, No. PX-
91-283 (Minn., Hennepin Cty. Prob. Ct., 1991). As one commentator has observed, "[t]hose who
believe the family's wishes should be decisive see the issue as one of autonomy. To them, a
family's right to discontinue treatment implies an analogous right to have it continued. Decision-
making authority means nothing unless the decision can go either way." Marcia Angell, After
Quinlan: The Dilemma of the Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1524, 1525
(1994).
87. The dissenting judge in the Baby K decision argued that, given her medical condition,
"whatever treatment appropriate for her unspeakably tragic illness should be regarded as a
continuum, not as a series of discrete emergency medical conditions to be considered in isolation."
In re Baby "K," 16 F.3d 590, 599 (4th Cir. 1994) (Sprouse, J., dissenting). In effect, the judge
suggested that the court permit Baby K's treating physicians to make decisions about appropriate
medical care by taking into account the reality of her condition and its terminal prognosis. The
dissenting judge went on to suggest that the court evaluate the propriety of these treatment
decisions against the legal vehicle of state malpractice law. See id. at 599. Commentators also
have suggested that ethical futility arguments permit the cessation of supportive measures,
sometimes even over the objections of family members. See Annas, supra note 10, at 1544 ("It is
true that parents have ... wide discretion in choosing among treatment options for their children
.... But it does not follow that physicians must do whatever parents . . . order them to do
regardless of standards of medical practice. Parents can choose among medically reasonable
treatment alternatives .... "). Many physicians appear willing to make a unilateral decision when
to continue treatment appears ethically futile. See David A. Asch et al., Decisions to Limit or
Continue Life-Sustaining Treatment by Critical Care Physicians in the United States: Conflicts
Between Physicians' Practices and Patients' Wishes, 151 Am. J. RESPIR. CRITICAL CARE MED.
288 (1995) (finding that 83% of physicians surveyed agreed that they would make a unilateral
decision to stop treatments that would provide no significant chance of survival or "meaningful"
survival).
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for anencephalic infants (or adults in PVS), given that both conditions
prevent affected individuals from experiencing pain or suffering of any
kind? Commentators have suggested that continued treatment of Baby
K-based on symbolic purposes or on her mother's beliefs-was degrad-
ing to her "because to do so is to treat her as an object-as a means to
someone else's ends."88 One might make the same argument concerning
the continued treatment of Theresa Schiavo, particularly now that her
life has become a symbolic cause for the political and religious right.89
Continued treatment with no hope of improvement imposes what many
would view as an intolerable burden on her dignity.
With respect to permanently unconscious adult patients, Professor
Norman Cantor has argued that, in the absence of specific evidence to
the contrary, physicians and family members frequently presume that the
patient would not wish continued life support once the permanence of
the patient's vegetative state is confirmed.90 According to this prag-
matic approach, the application of a best interests standard permits the
withdrawal of support from permanently unconscious patients because
most people would not choose to continue with life support in these
circumstances.9' Of course, as Professor Cantor acknowledges, this pre-
sumption risks error in "the small percentage" of cases where there is no
evidence of an individual's wishes and that person actually would, if
asked, choose to continue care.92 Even more problematic, the argument
88. See Annas, supra note 10, at 1543-44. Ms. Harrell expressed a firm religious conviction
that God would work a miracle in her child's case if that was his will. At the same time, in
addition to continued ventilator and respiratory support for the baby, Ms. Harrell sought an
orthopedic surgeon to build a skull to cover the child's head. See Karen R. Long, Whose Life Is It,
Anyway? Debate Rages on Baby K, CLEVE. PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 9, 1994, at IA. Such requests are
subject to differing interpretation, but commentators such as Professor Annas would probably
view them as inappropriately objectifying the child.
89. Cf Lars Noah, A Postmodernist Take on the Human Embryo Research Debate, 36 CoNN.
L. Rav. 1133, 1147-52 & n.130 (2004).
90. See Cantor, supra note 22, at 415-17 (explaining that concerns about preserving human
dignity justify this presumption).
91. See id. at 410 (explaining that many courts have concurred with the Quinlan court's
"instinctive understanding" that "most people would prefer not to be held comatose 'prisoner[s] of
medical technology"'); see also In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976):
In this case, the doctors say that removing Karen from the respirator will conflict
with their professional judgment. The plaintiff answers that Karen's present
treatment serves only a maintenance function; that the respirator cannot cure or
improve her condition but at best can only prolong her inevitable slow deterioration
and death; and that the interests of the patient, as seen by her surrogate, the
guardian, must be evaluated by the court as predominant ....
Id. at 663-64. As explained above, the Florida statute permitting the removal of supportive
measures from a patient in a permanent vegetative state, even in the absence of any indication that
this would be the patient's preference, would appear to permit such a presumption by the guardian
and the reviewing court. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
92. See Cantor, supra note 22, at 416.
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is entirely contingent on the continuing validity of the foundational pre-
sumption. If the majority view described by Professor Cantor drives the
presumption against continued treatment of persons in PVS, should we
invert the presumption if a shift occurs over time and the majority of
persons polled would prefer to continue treatment in a vegetative
state?93 The Florida legislature may well believe that it has acted on just
such a change in public attitude. Those individuals who would choose
to refuse treatment would express outrage over such a majority rule, just
as those who feel continued treatment is ethically mandatory express
outrage over the proposed withdrawal of treatment from Theresa Schi-
avo. Thus, the best we can do is to strive to exercise an individual's
choice based on the evidence available.
D. Other Means to Manage These Sorts of Conflicts
How else might we manage these sorts of intra-familial conflicts
about the appropriate treatment for an incapacitated individual who is
terminally ill or in PVS? None of the arguments regarding the unconsti-
tutionality of "Terri's Law" are meant to suggest that the legislature
lacks the authority to rectify the more general problem of how to settle
disputes about end-of-life medical decisions.94 The legislature could, for
instance, attempt to codify its preference for erring on the side of contin-
ued treatment when family members disagree about an incapacitated
patient's wishes by enacting a non-retroactive statute that applies to all
Floridians and requires a written advance directive in these cases. Such
a requirement might be challenged as creating too substantial an obstacle
to the exercise of a patient's right of self-determination, but that debate
undoubtedly would occur with more deliberation and openness than this
recent series of events has permitted."
Because the actual preference of the patient is unknowable, some deviation from
what would have been the patient's actual preference is inevitable. A small
percentage of vegetative persons might die who would have preferred to live. On
the other hand, if the prevailing policy were to preserve all vegetative persons, a
high percentage would be sustained indefinitely in a technological limbo when they
would have preferred to die.
Id.
93. Such a shift may be occurring right now in Florida and Professor Cantor acknowledges
the possibility of this eventuality. Id. at 416 ("Of course, the assertion that a clear majority of
persons would prefer a particular path, such as cessation of artificial nutrition, is always subject to
challenge.").
94. Legislatures frequently enact laws inspired by high profile incidents or judicial decisions.
Indeed, legislation may seek to overturn unwise extensions of the common law (e.g., overly
generous tort doctrine) or misinterpretations of existing statutes, see John Copeland Nagle,
Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. Rav. 1267 (1996), but such acts normally have general and only
prospective effect.
95. Somewhat more moderate amendments to procedural protections might include requiring
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Late in 2003, a Republican legislator proposed a bill in the Florida
Senate, evocatively titled the "Starvation and Dehydration of Persons
with Disabilities Prevention Act,"9 6 that sought to establish a legislative
presumption that patients in PVS would want to continue artificial nutri-
tion and hydration in the absence of an explicit, written refusal in an
advance directive, and that the artificial nutrition and hydration must be
provided unless it would be medically futile to do so. The sponsoring
senator has acknowledged that he drafted the bill with input from Flor-
ida Right to Life and the Florida Catholic Conference.97 Remarkably,
the bill also contains the following provision: "This act shall apply pro-
spectively in litigation pending on the effective date of this act and shall
supersede any court order issued under the law in effect before the effec-
tive date of this act."9 8 In effect, the language would guarantee that if
the Theresa Schiavo litigation is still pending, all of the judicial orders
up to that point would be rendered void to the extent that they conflict
with the act. In addition to its retroactivity problems, it appears likely
that the bill would face substantial obstacles because it would interfere
with the recognition of patient rights by the federal and state courts. 99
In the alternative, if the legislature wished to consider a non-judi-
cial option for the resolution of end-of-life disputes, it could amend the
statute to establish an interdisciplinary panel or standing committee of
appointed experts, somewhat like a hospital ethics committee, comprised
of physicians, clergy, social workers, and maybe even a lawyer or two
with expertise in medical ethics and law to decide these disputes.' 00 To
preserve the independence of the panel, the enacting legislation could
require partisan balance, staggered terms, dismissal only for cause, and
a heightened standard of proof of the patient's intentions, giving spouses lower priority in the
decisional hierarchy, or requiring the use of a court-appointed guardian whenever an incapacitated
patient has no advance directive.
96. See S.B. 692, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2003), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/
session/2004/Senate/bills/billtext/pdf/s0692.pdf (last visited June 8, 2004).
97. See Jerome R. Stockfisch, Changes in Proposed Right-To-Die Laws, Tampa Bay Online,
at http://news.tbo.comnews/mgan946wqnd.html (Dec. 3, 2003). Interestingly, the bill contains
language that would appear to allow verbal refusals of treatment. As currently drafted, the
presumption of treatment would not apply when there is "clear and convincing evidence that the
incompetent person, when competent, gave express and informed consent to withdrawing or
withholding nutrition or hydration in the applicable circumstances." The sponsor of the bill
stated, however, that language was included in error and that he intended to strike the language
from the proposed legislation. See id.
98. See S.B. 692, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2004), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/
session/2004/Senate/bills/billtext/pdf/s0692.pdf (last visited June 8, 2004).
99. The bill was withdrawn from consideration on April 16, 2004, after many members of the
Florida legislature protested that it inappropriately restricted privacy rights. See id.
100. See generally Lars Noah, Deputizing Institutional Review Boards to Police (Audit?)
Biomedical Research, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 267 (2004); cf I. Glenn Cohen, Negotiating Death: ADR
and End of Life Decision-making, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 253 (2004).
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other types of safeguards, much like those designed to insulate federal
commissions. This approach would, however, create a new set of ques-
tions and problems. For example, after one party to the dispute has
received the "wrong" answer from the panel, could they pursue an
appeal in the Florida courts? That might work well if the new system
adopts a very deferential standard of judicial review, beginning with a
presumption that the panel's determination was correct and permitting
reversal of the panel's decisions only in cases of abuse of discretion. Of
course, at this point, if judicial review confirmed the panel's "wrong"
decision, there would be little to prevent the dissenting party from using
the same strategy that the Schindlers did in the Schiavo case.
It is unlikely that this independent panel would function more effi-
ciently or equitably than the current judicial resolution approach.
Although judges in Florida and many other states are elected and may
worry that reaching conclusions in these cases that conflict with the
right-to-life agenda will harm their re-election chances, it seems likely
that members of an independent panel would be even more susceptible
to partisan politics and other external pressures. Certain aspects of end-
of-life disputes require professional expertise, but the key to resolving
these differences lies in efficient, careful fact-finding: the judiciary's
forte. At a less theoretical level, it is not clear that this hypothetical
executive agency would have the legal authority to direct a long-term
care facility or a hospital to withdraw life-support, whereas the courts
clearly do. In the end, courts remain the best forum for resolving these
sorts of disputes, although it might make sense to reconsider certain
aspects of this type of litigation, such as burdens of proof, procedures,
fact-finding processes, or a requirement of neutral experts.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
In this case, it is unfortunate, though unsurprising, that Theresa
never formalized her preferences in a written advance directive. Few
people in their mid-twenties prepare for the possibility of sudden physi-
cal and mental incapacity. Frankly, however, even had she done so,
these events suggest that Theresa's parents might very well refuse to
believe that she could have signed such a document and allege in court
that it was forged, or verbally withdrawn, even without any extrinsic
evidence to support the charge.' If the courts were to reject this con-
tention, the parents could march to the Governor, the legislature, and the
media, reiterating their allegations. If successful in pursuing this extra-
legal appeal, it would amount to a de facto amendment of state law,
101. In Florida, a living will only establishes a rebuttable presumption of clear and convincing
evidence of the patient's wishes. See FLA. STAT. ch. 765.302(c) (2004).
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creating a situation where any patient's relative would have the power to
veto a living will that directs the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.
Nevertheless, the controversy over Theresa Schiavo provides a jarring
reminder of the importance of advance directives for all adults, includ-
ing the young and healthy.
Using legal mechanisms to decide end-of-life disputes does nothing
to resolve the underlying moral and ethical conflicts. Because this coun-
try consists of individuals with diverse and strongly held religious and
ethical convictions, achieving consensus on these sorts of questions
seems unrealistic. A lack of consensus on these issues starkly illustrates
why we need legal mechanisms that preserve the individual's right to
make decisions without interference from the government. These cases
must be decided on a principled basis, not in a result-oriented fashion.
Through their meddling in a single difficult end-of-life decision,
arrived at after careful consideration during years of grueling litigation,
the Florida legislature and the Governor have succeeded in unsettling, at
least temporarily, the basic presumptions under which the state's citizens
make choices (or postpone making choices) about end-of-life care. The-
resa Schiavo's slow death has and will continue to highlight the dynamic
tension between the disciplines of medicine, ethics, religion and law.
Her very private tragedy and the difficult decision that followed it have
become sensational fodder for the media, politicians, and religious orga-
nizations. These developments raise troubling concerns about interfer-
ence in Theresa Schiavo's autonomous rights and the rights of others
who may find themselves in similar circumstances in the future. Every-
one wants to retain the freedom to make choices about end-of-life care
based on their own values and beliefs, rather than allowing these deci-
sions to be made according to the will of the majority or the wishes of
those in political power. Unfortunately, as the examples above demon-
strate, there are those who, while retaining freedom of choice for them-
selves, hypocritically seek to impose their will on others who do not
share their views. In view of this reality, it is essential that individual
choice remain the touchstone in end-of-life decision-making, and that
courts, legislatures, and individuals do everything possible to prevent
this very precious choice from being held hostage to the vicissitudes of
political or moral change.
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